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Conflicting Approaches to Addressing Ex-Offender 
Unemployment: The Work Opportunity Tax Credit and 
Ban the Box 
KATHERINE ENGLISH* 
Each year, roughly 700,000 prisoners are released from their six-by-eight-foot 
cells and back into society.1 Sadly, though, many of these ex-prisoners are not truly 
free. Upon returning to society, they often encounter several challenges that prevent 
them from resuming a normal, reintegrated lifestyle.2 For many, the difficulties as-
sociated with reentry prove to be too much, and within a short three years of their 
release, two-thirds of ex-offenders are rearrested, reconvicted, and thrown back into 
the familiar six-by-eight-foot cell.3 Recidivism might appear to be entirely the ex-
offenders’ fault, but ex-offenders are not solely responsible for these recidivism rates 
or the solution to this problem. Society must also understand and confront the chal-
lenges of the reentry process to “better serve prisoners, their families, their commu-
nities, and society at large.”4 
The topic of ex-offender reentry is part of a much broader discussion of criminal 
justice reform. Many people are dedicated to reforming the criminal justice system 
as a whole. One example of criminal justice reform is the movement towards reduc-
ing mass incarceration and shifting away from the retributive focus of incarceration.5 
There are also efforts to reduce the length of criminal sentences, as the recent reduc-
tion in sentences for some drug offenses demonstrates.6 The House Judiciary 
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 1. See DAN BLOOM, JOYCE FOUND., TRANSITIONAL JOBS REENTRY DEMONSTRATION 1 
(2009); MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: 
PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 1 (2014); PAMELA K. LATTIMORE, SUSAN BRUMBAUGH, 
CHRISTY VISHER, CHRISTINE LINDQUIST, LAURA WINTERFIELD, MEGHAN SALAS & JANINE ZWEIG, 
NATIONAL PORTRAIT OF SVORI: SERIOUS AND VIOLENT OFFENDER REENTRY INITIATIVE 1 (2004). 
 2. See AMY L. SOLOMON, KELLY DEDEL JOHNSON, JEREMY TRAVIS & ELIZABETH C. 
MCBRIDE, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FROM PRISON TO WORK: THE EMPLOYMENT 
DIMENSIONS OF PRISONER REENTRY 1 (2004). To compare, Norway has one of the lowest recidi-
vism rates in the world at a two-year recidivism rate of twenty percent. Jessica Benko, The 
Radical Humaneness of Norway’s Halden Prison, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 26, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/magazine/the-radical-humaneness-of-norways-halden-
prison.html [https://perma.cc/TWP8-VWLB]. 
 3. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See JAMES AUSTIN, ERIC CADORA, TODD R. CLEAR, KARA DANSKY, JUDITH GREENE, 
VANITA GUPTA, MARC MAUER, NICOLE PORTER, SUSAN TUCKER & MALCOM C. YOUNG, ENDING 
MASS INCARCERATION: CHARTING A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT (2013). 
 6. What You Need To Know About the New Federal Prisoner Release, MARSHALL PROJECT 
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Committee is also involved in reform efforts in its work on several bipartisan bills 
aimed at reforming many aspects of the criminal justice system.7 However, these 
reform efforts will only truly work if ex-offender reentry works,8 and one key piece 
to successful reentry is the focus of this Note: ex-offender employment.9 
Because an ex-offender’s unemployment status is the primary predictor of that 
individual’s likelihood of recidivating,10 this Note concentrates on the employment 
piece of the reentry picture.  The majority of ex-offenders cannot find jobs after re-
lease from prison.11 The individuals returning to society face several barriers to em-
ployment, such as being less educated than the average adult,12 lacking work experi-
ence,13 and combating the stigma attached to having a criminal record.14 While the 
challenge of successful reintegration is multifaceted and not exclusively dependent 
on securing employment, strong policies directed at employing ex-offenders have 
the potential to make a meaningful difference, helping these individuals reenter so-
ciety more effectively. 
This Note examines two current policies aimed at employing ex-offenders. First, 
this Note assesses the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), a federal tax credit 
that private employers can claim for hiring individuals of certain target groups.15 One 
of these target groups is ex-felons released within the past year.16 This Note analyzes 
whether the WOTC is achieving its goal of encouraging employers to hire chroni-
cally unemployed individuals such as ex-felons and recommends how to improve the 
WOTC.17 
The second policy this Note examines is “Ban the Box,” which aims to improve 
ex-offenders’ job prospects by requiring employers to remove the criminal history 
                                                                                                             
 
(Oct. 29, 2015, 9:27 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/06/what-you-need-
to-know-about-the-new-federal-prisoner-release [https://perma.cc/EP6Y-PLFH] (describ-
ing an early release of approximately 6000 prisoners convicted of federal drug crimes “in an 
effort to reduce overcrowding and provide relief to drug offenders who received harsh 
sentences over the past three decades”). 
 7. Criminal Justice Reform Initiative, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/issue/criminal-justice-reform-initiative [https://perma.cc/2F4E-
CJTJ] (explaining bipartisan bills aimed at sentencing reform, overcriminalization, prison re-
form, and more).  
 8. See Why Recidivism Is a Core Criminal Justice Concern, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Oct. 3, 
2008), https://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/core-concern.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/8G6W-ET84] (explaining that the issue of recidivism touches all areas of criminal 
justice). 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10.  Susan Lockwood, John M. Nally, Taiping Ho & Katie Knutson, The Effect of 
Correctional Education on Postrelease Employment and Recidivism: A 5-Year Follow-Up 
Study in the State of Indiana, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 380, 382 (2012). 
 11. VERA KACHNOWSKI, RETURNING HOME ILLINOIS POLICY BRIEF: EMPLOYMENT AND 
PRISONER REENTRY 3 (2005). 
 12. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. 
 13. See id. at 12. 
 14. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 939 (2003). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
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check box from job applications.18 Ban the Box legislation has recently received 
much attention in the press and in academic discussion because new research has 
reported that there are unintended negative consequences of the legislation.19 The 
research has found that while Ban the Box has successfully helped ex-offenders se-
cure employment, the legislation has also led to increased discrimination of young 
men of color, including those without a criminal record.20 Given this negative re-
search, this Note analyzes whether Ban the Box’s approach to the ex-offender 
unemployment problem is the correct one.21 Arguably, Ban the Box seeks to assist 
ex-offenders secure jobs by hiding their criminal history, whereas the WOTC seeks 
to assist chronically unemployed individuals by acknowledging their past.22 The two 
pieces of legislation appear to have contradicting ways of achieving the same goal. 
This Note attempts to begin the discussion on how to improve these policies in order 
to work together to serve the goal of employing ex-offenders.23 
Accordingly, Part I explains the barriers that ex-offenders face when seeking em-
ployment and the consequences of not securing a job. This Note explains how being 
unemployed—and thus increasing the likelihood of recidivism—not only impacts 
the ex-offender himself but also his family and society in general. Part II evaluates 
one of two current policies focused on employment, the WOTC, and makes recom-
mendations for improvement. Part III discusses the recent debate on Ban the Box 
legislation, and Part IV examines the interplay between Ban the Box and the WOTC. 
This Note explains how Ban the Box research further demonstrates the desperate 
need for changing employers’ hiring practices and argues that while the WOTC is 
not perfect, the WOTC’s overall approach is a better way of tackling this goal. 
I. EX-OFFENDER UNEMPLOYMENT 
Ex-offenders struggle to secure employment post-release. In a survey of male 
prisoners returning to Chicago post-incarceration, only forty-four percent reported 
that they worked for at least a week in the first four to eight months after their release 
from prison.24 Chicago is not unique concerning this matter; in fact, “[s]everal studies 
have tracked employment rates for former prisoners during the year following re-
lease, typically finding that fewer than half are employed at any point.”25 The re-
mainder of this Part will explain why ex-offenders have trouble finding jobs and the 
consequences of their unemployment. 
                                                                                                             
 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical 
Discrimination: A Field of Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191 (2018); Jennifer L. Doleac & 
Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical 
Discrimination and Employment Outcomes when Criminal Histories Are Hidden (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers 
/w22469.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3JU-6B55]. 
 20. See Agan & Starr, supra note 19; Doleac & Hanson, supra note 19.  
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. KACHNOWSKI, supra note 11, at 3. 
 25. BLOOM, supra note 1, at 6. 
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A. Ex-Offenders’ Barriers to Employment 
Many factors impact ex-offenders’ job searches. First, there are what this Note 
refers to as internal barriers—those associated with the ex-offenders’ attributes. For 
example, incarcerated individuals tend to be significantly less educated than the gen-
eral population; a reported forty percent of inmates in state and federal prisons have 
neither a high school diploma nor a GED.26 Another significant internal barrier is 
substance abuse. Three out of four individuals released from state prisons each year 
abuse alcohol and/or drugs.27 Additionally, thirty-one percent of state inmates have 
a physical impairment or mental condition.28 Because being incarcerated for perhaps 
many months or years means being out of the workforce for a long time, ex-offenders 
are also likely to lack work experience and a relevant skillset when seeking employ-
ment upon release.29 
In addition to internal barriers to employment, ex-offenders face external 
barriers—those associated with employers and society generally. For instance, most 
ex-offenders return to distressed communities, making reintegrating and finding a 
job even more challenging.30 Employers may also be apprehensive of hiring ex-
offenders because of negligent hiring liability.31 There are also statutory restrictions 
on hiring individuals with criminal records; all fifty states, to some degree, have 
restrictions on ex-felons working in public sector jobs.32 
The stigma attached to being an ex-offender may cause employers to discriminate 
against these individuals during the hiring process.33 There is little statutory protec-
tion for this type of discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196434 does 
not explicitly prohibit pre-employment inquiries about an applicant’s criminal his-
tory or the use of an applicant’s criminal record when making hiring decisions.35 
                                                                                                             
 
 26. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. 
 27. INT’L INST. FOR ALCOHOL AWARENESS, MAKE EX-OFFENDER REENTRY A SUCCESS: 
ADDRESSING ACCESS TO ALCOHOL 1–2, http://www.nafj.org/pdfs/policybriefreentryweb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KV9W-THZV]. 
 28. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. 
 29. See id. at 12.  
 30. Id. at 1; DAN BLOOM, MDRC, EMPLOYMENT-FOCUSED PROGRAMS FOR EX-PRISONERS 
10 (2006). According to an Urban Institute study of Baltimore-area ex-offenders, prisoners 
who recidivate tend to come from a concentrated set of a few communities, which have 
“above-average rates for unemployment, percent female-headed households, and percent of 
families living below the poverty level.” CHRISTY VISHER, NANCY LAVIGNE & JEREMY 
TRAVIS, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., RETURNING HOME: UNDERSTANDING THE 
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 5 (2004). 
 31. See generally Stacy A. Hickox, Employer Liability for Negligent Hiring of Ex-
Offenders, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1001, 1002 (2011) (providing background on employers’ con-
cerns of negligent hiring liability, explaining that “[u]nder state doctrines of negligent hiring 
and retention, employers have been liable to victims injured by an employee if the employer 
knew or should have known that its employee might render harm to another”). 
 32. Jordan Segall, Mass Incarceration, Ex-Felon Discrimination & Black Labor Market 
Disadvantage, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 159, 171 (2011). 
 33. See Pager, supra note 14. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 35. See id.; Kristen A. Williams, Comment, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the 
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However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued guid-
ance on proper use of an applicant’s criminal records for employment decisions, ex-
plaining that an employer’s use of criminal records in making employment decisions 
might violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36 The guidance distinguishes 
disparate treatment and disparate impact liability.37 First, a Title VII violation may 
occur “when an employer treats criminal history information differently for different 
applicants or employees, based on their race or national origin (disparate treatment 
liability).”38 Additionally, a violation may also occur when an employer has a policy 
or practice in which it uses criminal records in a manner that disparately impacts a 
Title VII-protected class, and the employer fails to show that the policy or practice 
is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity 
(disparate impact liability).”39 While these potential Title VII violations offer some 
protection to job-seeking ex-offenders, the EEOC’s efforts to litigate such cases have 
been largely unsuccessful due to the difficulty of proving disparate impact.40 
B. Consequences of Ex-Offender Unemployment 
Ex-offender unemployment impacts not only the ex-offender himself but also his 
family and society generally. When ex-prisoners return to society, they are likely 
returning to a family. The majority of ex-offenders are parents; more precisely, of 
the 700,000 individuals who are released from prison each year, approximately 
400,000 are fathers and mothers.41 While “[m]any parents who are discharged from 
prisons intend to reunite with their minor children,” many do not “anticipate the dif-
ficulties associated with doing so.”42 One hardship is the struggle of finding a job, 
leading to economic instability and the inability to provide for themselves and their 
family.43 
                                                                                                             
 
Evaluation of Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 521 (2007). 
 36. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 
ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS 
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 1 (2012).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1, 8. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 463 (4th Cir. 2015) (giving an 
example wherein the EEOC failed to prove that the employer’s use of applicants’ criminal 
records had a disparate impact on black and male applicants). 
 40. See, e.g., Freeman, 778 F.3d at 463 (affirming summary judgment in favor of the 
employer because of the EEOC’s failure to prove disparate impact); see also Terence G. 
Connor & Kevin J. White, The Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in 
Employment Decisions: A Critique of the EEOC Guidance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 980–
90 (2013). 
 41. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40499, CHILD SUPPORT AND 
EX-OFFENDERS 1 (2009). 
 42. STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILDREN OF 
INCARCERATED PARENTS 7 (2009). 
 43. See Amanda Geller, Paternal Incarceration and Father–Child Contact in Fragile 
Families, 75 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1288, 1289 (2013). 
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When the returning parent is not the custodial parent, child support obligations 
are likely to come into play. About half of incarcerated parents have open child sup-
port cases, and in many states child support debt accumulates while in prison.44 
Noncustodial parents with child support obligations usually reenter society with at 
least $20,000 in child support debt.45 This financial situation creates even more pres-
sure to find a job. Ultimately, the stress of not having a well-paying job causes many 
parents released from prison to generate illegal income and resume “their old way of 
life,” thus leading to the cycle of reoffending.46 Because so many reentering individ-
uals are parents, and their success affects their children’s well-being, improving ex-
prisoners’ employment prospects is important for families.  
Ex-offender unemployment has a huge impact on society as well, leading to in-
creased crime and recidivism rates. To illustrate, an Indiana Department of 
Corrections (IDOC) study concluded that post-release employment status is the num-
ber one predicator of recidivism among ex-offenders after their release from IDOC 
custody: “Specifically, this study’s result demonstrated . . . that an unemployed of-
fender was 1.5 times more likely to become a recidivist offender compared with an 
offender who was employed.”47 In general, “higher levels of job instability have 
shown to lead to higher arrest rates,”48 and as wages increase, crime decreases.49 A 
White House report found that raising the minimum wage to twelve dollars per hour 
by 2020 would decrease crime by three to five percent.50 
Indeed, while employment is not the only piece of the reentry picture, there is a 
connection between ex-offender unemployment, crime rates, and recidivism rates.51 
The fiscal costs of recidivism and of incarceration are an immense financial burden 
to society.52 Incarcerating an inmate costs taxpayers approximately $34,000 per in-
mate per year, making the total bill around $80 billion per year.53 Presently, two-
                                                                                                             
 
 44. VICKI TURETSKY, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, STAYING IN JOBS AND OUT OF THE 
UNDERGROUND: CHILD SUPPORT POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE LEGITIMATE WORK 1 (2007); see 
also Geller, supra note 43, at 1290. 
 45. TURETSKY, supra note 44, at 1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Lockwood et al., supra note 10, at 390. 
 48. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 4; see also Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban 
the Box To Promote Ex-Offender Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 755 (2007). 
 49. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.  
 50. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2016); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RAISING THE 
MINIMUM WAGE: A PROGRESS UPDATE 5 (2016). 
 51. See Lockwood et al., supra note 10; Peter Cove & Lee Bowes, Immediate Access to 
Employment Reduces Recidivism, REALCLEARPOLITICS (June 11, 2015), http:// 
www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/06/11/immediate_access_to_employment_reduce
s_recidivism_126939.html [https://perma.cc/ZX7A-3HSJ]. But see Sam Schaeffer, It Takes 
More than Just a Job To Reduce Recidivism, LIVING CITIES (May 8, 2014), https:// 
www.livingcities.org/blog/564-it-takes-more-than-just-a-job-to-reduce-recidivism [https:// 
perma.cc/6533-636F].  
 52. BLOOM, supra note 30, at 2. 
 53. MELISSA S. KEARNEY, BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, ELISA JÁCOME & LUCIE PARKER, THE 
HAMILTON PROJECT, TEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2 (2014); Does the U.S. Spend $80 Billion a Year on Incarceration?, COMMITTEE FOR 
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thirds of ex-offenders recidivate within three years of their release,54 but addressing 
ex-offender unemployment issues would help decrease crime rates, reduce recid-
ivism rates, and diminish overall societal costs of incarceration. Ex-offenders’ suc-
cessful employment betters society. “When ex-offenders are productively engaged 
in their communities, working and supporting their families, the community is safer 
and their families are more economically secure.”55  
While benefiting their families and society, employing ex-offenders also, of 
course, benefits the ex-offenders themselves, setting them up for success rather than 
failure. “Workplace discipline . . . helps stabilize the lives of individuals, improving 
many aspects of their well-being.”56 Furthermore, “[b]y obtaining employment and 
gaining financial independence, former felons will be able to earn a living, care for 
their families, pay child support, reduce welfare, become tax-paying citizens, and 
reduce long-term unemployment.”57 
II. THE WORK OPPORTUNITY TAX CREDIT 
The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC)58 might be one solution to the ex-
offender unemployment problem. The WOTC is a tax credit that private employers 
can claim against their federal income tax liabilities by hiring members of eight tar-
geted groups: ex-felons released within the past year; veterans; Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients; Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) recipients; Designated Community Residents; voca-
tional rehabilitation referrals; Supplemental Security Income recipients; and summer 
youth employees living in Empowerment Zones.59 The WOTC targets individuals 
who are chronically unemployed and “have been disadvantaged in their ability to 
participate in the workforce in part because of a lack of job experience.”60 The 
WOTC seeks to increase the chances that these disadvantaged individuals will find 
jobs, thus obtaining work experience and helping them secure stable jobs later.61 
The amount of the tax credit that businesses may claim depends on the hired in-
dividual’s target group, wage, and the number of hours worked during the first year 
                                                                                                             
 
RESPONSIBLE BUDGET (Dec. 23, 2015), http://crfb.org/blogs/us-spends-80-billion-year-
incarceration [https://perma.cc/E98E-8W4P]; The Right Choices, ECONOMIST (June 20, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21654578-americas-bloated-prison-system-has-
stopped-growing-now-it-must-shrink-right-choices [https://perma.cc/4ZDM-5V4J]. 
 54. BLOOM, supra note 1, at 1; DUROSE ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
 55. Promote Workforce Strategies for Reintegrating Ex-Offenders, CTR. FOR STUDY SOC. 
POL’Y, http://www.policyforresults.org/poverty-economic/promote-workforce-strategies-for-
reintegrating-ex-offenders [https://perma.cc/N24C-U4CF]. 
 56. PETER CAPPELLI, ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF THE WORK OPPORTUNITY TAX CREDIT 3 
(2011). 
 57. Heidi A. Hillyer, Reducing the Rate of Prison Recidivism in Florida by Providing 
State Corporate Income Tax Credits to Businesses as an Incentive for Employment of Ex-
Felons, 21 BARRY L. REV. 105, 107 (2015). 
 58. I.R.C. § 51 (West Supp. 2017). 
 59. CHRISTINE SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30089, THE WORK OPPORTUNITY TAX 
CREDIT (WOTC) 6–7 (2013). 
 60. CAPPELLI, supra note 56, at 10. 
 61. Id. 
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of employment.62 The hired individual must work at least 120 hours during the first 
year of employment.63 After the hired individual has worked at least 120 hours but 
less than 400 hours, the employer may claim a tax credit equal to 25% of the new 
hire’s first year of qualified wages.64 After the hired individual has worked more than 
400 hours, the employer may claim a tax credit equal to 40% of the new hire’s first 
year of wages.65 There is also a maximum tax credit, based on the target group, that 
an employer may claim. For an ex-felon who worked at least 120 hours but less than 
400 hours, for example, the employer may claim a maximum tax credit of $1500.66 
For an ex-felon who worked more than 400 hours, the employer may claim a maxi-
mum tax credit of $2400.67 Also, the total of all WOTC credits claimed by an em-
ployer cannot exceed 90% of that employer’s annual income tax liability.68 
As the Congressional Research Service explains, determining whether an individ-
ual is WOTC-eligible can take two different routes: (1) an eligible group member 
obtains a certification from a participating agency and then uses it to market himself 
to an employer, or (2) an employer completes an IRS Form 8850 by the date it makes 
a job offer to an applicant believed to be WOTC-eligible.69 The latter is the more 
common route of the two.70 
The employer receives the WOTC tax credit for hiring individuals of the WOTC 
target groups who have obtained a WOTC certification. The number of people who 
receive a WOTC certification under the “ex-felon” target group is small compared 
to the number of people who get a certification under other WOTC groups. For ex-
ample, in 2012, a total of 892,314 WOTC certifications were issued overall, but only 
22,063 of these certifications were for ex-felons.71 To compare, 602,540 certifica-
tions were issued to SNAP recipients.72  
Despite the relatively small number of WOTC certifications issued based on ex-
felon status compared to other target groups, it is still important to examine the 
WOTC in the ex-offender context. A significant point to highlight is this: it makes 
sense that there are more SNAP recipients obtaining WOTC certifications because 
there are millions more SNAP recipients than there are ex-felons who have been 
released from prison within the past year. For example, in August 2017, 21,374,050 
households—not even individuals, but households—participated in SNAP.73 This 
is much more than the 700,000 individuals who are released from prison each 
                                                                                                             
 
 62. I.R.C. § 51; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO THE WORK OPPORTUNITY 
TAX CREDIT (2014). 
 63. I.R.C. § 51(i)(3)(B); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 62, at 4. 
 64. I.R.C. § 51(i)(3)(A); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 62, at 4. 
 65. I.R.C. § 51(i)(3)(A); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 62, at 5. 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 62, at 5. 
 67. Id. 
 68. SCOTT, supra note 59, at 9. 
 69. Id. at 9–10. 
 70. Id. at 9. 
 71. Id. at 11. 
 72. Id. 
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ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS PARTICIPATING (2017). 
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year.74 Additionally, the number of felons in that 700,000 figure is likely even 
smaller, assuming some of those released individuals committed misdemeanors, not 
felonies. Also, some ex-felons might receive WOTC certification under another 
WOTC target group; for example, it is quite likely that many ex-felons are also SNAP 
recipients.75 In short, while the WOTC affects higher numbers of people in other 
target populations, it does touch a significant number of ex-felons relative to how 
many are released within a year.76 Moreover, the WOTC has the potential to impact 
even more ex-felons based on the recommendations made later in this Note.77 
The WOTC is a temporary provision of the Internal Revenue Code, and so 
Congress must reauthorize it periodically. This Note examines whether the WOTC 
is meeting its goal of promoting ex-offender employment and whether it should be 
reauthorized. Unfortunately, the research on the WOTC is extremely limited and 
“has done little to assess whether these tax credits have met the goal of improving 
employment outcomes among the disadvantaged.”78 Notably, Congress has 
reauthorized the program several times—even though there has not been a 
thorough study on the program’s effectiveness.79 
In sum, the WOTC strives to offer a cost-effective way of encouraging 
employers to change their hiring practices and to hire chronically unemployed 
individuals, including ex-felons who have been released within the past year. The 
following Part evaluates the effectiveness of the WOTC and makes 
recommendations for improvement. To assess the WOTC’s effectiveness, a few 
other questions must be initially examined. Part II.A analyzes whether WOTC-
participating employers actually hire more WOTC-targeted individuals than they 
would have without participating in the WOTC. Part II.B evaluates the cost-
effectiveness of the WOTC. Finally, Part II.C explores whether many employers 
are participating in the WOTC in the first place. 
A. The WOTC Might Change Participating Employers’ Hiring Practices 
First, is the WOTC changing WOTC-participating employer practices? A 
Government Accountability Office (GAO)80 study81 addressed this question; the 
                                                                                                             
 
 74. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 75. CAPPELLI, supra note 56, at 23. 
 76. SCOTT, supra note 59, at 11. 
 77. See infra Part II.D. 
 78. Sarah Hamersma, The Effects of an Employer Subsidy on Employment Outcomes: A 
Study of the Work Opportunity and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credits, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 498, 501 (2008). 
 79. Id. at 498. Interestingly, the reauthorization of the WOTC was recently at risk in the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). The WOTC would have 
been repealed by section 3404 of the House bill. H.R. REP. 115-409, at 69 (2017). However, 
the Senate amendment to the bill had no provision that repealed the WOTC. H. REPT. 115-
466, at 438 (2017). The final conference agreement did not follow the House bill provision 
that would have repealed the WOTC, so the WOTC survived the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Id. 
 80. GAO was originally established as the Government Accounting Office. Its name was 
changed in 2014. Our Name, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov 
/about/namechange.html [https://perma.cc/BP4T-2RFX]. 
 81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-329, WORK OPPORTUNITY TAX CREDIT: 
522 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:513 
 
 
GAO’s sample consisted of WOTC-participating employers in California and 
Texas.82 The research concluded that “the tax subsidy was by far the factor motivating 
employers to hire WOTC eligible workers.”83 The study also estimated that “three-
quarters of employers changed their employment practices in some way to 
accommodate WOTC recipients, and half changed training practices.”84 The fact that 
the employers would spend time and resources on changing their hiring and training 
practices is significant, according to Peter Cappelli, a Wharton School professor, be-
cause it shows that they are making these new efforts specifically to hire WOTC-
certified individuals.85 He explains, “These changes cost money. If employers would 
have hired applicants like the WOTC candidates even without their participation in the 
program, it is very difficult to understand why they went to the trouble of putting in 
these new practices.”86 
In 2001, however, the United States Department of Labor (DOL) conducted another 
study examining whether the WOTC changes participating employers’ practices.87 
This study consisted of interviews of sixteen WOTC-participating employers across 
five states: California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, and Wisconsin.88 The study 
concluded that “the tax credits play little or no role in [the 16 employers’] recruitment 
policies,” suggesting that employers would have hired members of the target groups 
even if the programs were not available.89 These sixteen employers “report[ed] very 
few changes in recruiting, hiring, or wage policy based on the subsidy.”90 
There are two primary concerns if the DOL study’s findings are representative of 
the program as a whole. First, the findings are concerning from the taxpayers’ per-
spective because this means that the employers are getting a windfall. They are able 
to claim this tax credit for employees they would have hired without the tax credit. 
Second, the goal of the program is to encourage employers to change their practices 
so that they hire individuals from WOTC target groups. DOL concluded that the 
WOTC program does not change employer’s hiring practices. However, the DOL 
report’s authors did acknowledge that the study was based on a small sample size 
and recommended that a study with a larger sample be conducted, as the study 
“raise[s] a question about the extent to which the tax credit is serving the purpose for 
which it is intended—to serve as an economic incentive to encourage employers to 
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hire individuals from specified target groups whom they would not have hired in the 
absence of the credit.”91 
The GAO and DOL studies had different results, and so it is not completely clear 
whether the WOTC is changing employer practices. Because of this uncertainty, this 
Note recommends, as the DOL researchers did, that the government needs to conduct 
more thorough research on the program. Congress continues to reauthorize a program 
that is not certain to change employer practices, a key part of the program’s goal. 
In the ex-offender reentry context, this Note urges that a longitudinal study be 
conducted specifically on the WOTC-participating employees who are ex-felons. 
While the WOTC might aid ex-felons in finding employment shortly after their 
release, it is important to see what happens to WOTC-participating ex-felons in the 
longer term. For example, do the skills they obtain for the WOTC employment enable 
them to move on to higher paid jobs? Do they advance in the company? 
B. The WOTC Is Cost-Effective for Employers and Taxpayers 
Another question that is important to ask in order to assess whether the WOTC is 
meeting its goal is whether the WOTC is cost-effective for employers and society. 
Many argue that from the employers’ standpoint, the costs of employing these dis-
advantaged individuals targeted by the WOTC are likely to be considerably higher 
than hiring individuals who are ineligible for the WOTC. “[T]he attributes of the 
targeted group[s]”—such as lacking work experience, education, and skills or being 
prone to substance abuse—“are those that make them more difficult and expensive 
to employ.”92 These attributes likely require more extensive training, for example. 
However, even if employing these individuals necessitates additional expenses, the 
DOL’s research concluded “employers have a positive assessment of the WOTC . . . 
and that they view the subsidies as reimbursement for the added expenses of training 
and mentoring disadvantaged employees.”93 
Another argument that hiring WOTC-targeted individuals is costly is that their 
relative lack of education, work experience, and skills, in addition to their increased 
risk of substance abuse problems, causes higher turnover rates for WOTC workers 
than those for non-WOTC workers.94 Because many employers believe this, they 
worry about costs of recruiting, rehiring, and retraining individuals to replace former 
WOTC employees.95 The state of Georgia conducted a study to examine actual 
turnover rates of WOTC workers.96 The study compared WOTC employees to non-
WOTC employees working the same jobs at a large employer in Georgia.97 There 
might be a misconception that because of their attributes, WOTC-eligible individuals 
would be more likely to leave the company than non-WOTC individuals. However, 
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Georgia’s research concluded that WOTC workers are less likely to leave the com-
pany than their non-WOTC counterparts and actually stayed with the employer 
longer than their non-WOTC counterparts.98 Therefore, this research counters the 
misconception that WOTC employees have higher turnover rates and shows that 
WOTC-targeted individuals tend to be loyal employees to the companies willing to 
give them a chance.99 
Notably, WOTC workers have a lower turnover rate despite the negative 
attributes associated with WOTC-eligible individuals. Cappelli expounds on this 
point, which the Georgia study omitted: WOTC participants are indeed different 
from the comparison non-WOTC group. That is to say, non-WOTC employees do 
not have the same set of negative attributes as the WOTC-eligible individuals, or 
else they would have qualified for the WOTC.100 These negative attributes of the 
WOTC participants are precisely what make them eligible for the WOTC.101 This 
is significant because, in theory, “the WOTC recipients should be relatively 
disadvantaged because of those attributes as compared to non-participants and 
should have worse outcomes, other things equal.”102 The fact that WOTC 
participants do not have worse workplace outcomes should be very encouraging. 
They are able to secure and retain employment longer than their counterparts 
notwithstanding beginning farther behind the start line than their peers.103 These 
outcomes are important when addressing whether the program is cost-effective 
because the idea that WOTC-eligible individuals lead to inevitable rehiring and 
retraining costs is inaccurate. 
The WOTC is also cost-effective for society.104 Cappelli conducted a detailed 
analysis on the cost-effectiveness of the WOTC from society’s perspective, and he 
suggests that the WOTC decreases welfare dependence.105 Employing these 
targeted individuals results in some “public assistance that no longer needs to be 
paid.”106 As an illustration, the New York State Department of Labor conducted a 
study on the WOTC finding that two-thirds of WOTC-certified individuals 
received welfare and food stamps107 and that the WOTC program resulted in 
“reduced expenditures on public service programs for recipients who move into 
jobs.”108 Two researchers estimate that savings from the reduced public assistance 
expenditures for an individual are double the cost of the maximum WOTC subsidy 
spent on an individual.109 Additionally, the WOTC subsidy is a one-time payment, 
and the savings from it continue to accrue over time.110 
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Cappelli also stresses that putting a concrete monetary value on many of the 
benefits of the WOTC is difficult,111 but these benefits are extremely significant 
from the taxpayers’ standpoint.112 For example, according to the New York State 
Department of Labor study, reduced criminal conduct, reduced jail time, and 
reduced expenditures on vocational rehabilitation should be included as benefits to 
taxpayers.113 Cappelli explains, “[B]ringing such individuals into the labor force 
expands labor supply, puts downward pressure on wages, and lowers the natural 
rate of unemployment. Another [benefit] is that the work-related experience and 
skill that targeted individuals receive improves their productivity, spilling over to 
benefit the economy as a whole.”114 Cappelli explains the taxpayers’ perspective: 
The benefits to taxpayers appear to exceed the costs of the program. 
This is the case without counting many positive aspects of the program 
that are difficult to quantify, such as reductions in crime, healthcare 
costs, and other social programs, and positive macro-economic effects. 
Beyond the goal of assisting disadvantaged job seekers, the WOTC 
program should also be seen as a cost-saving program for the 
government.115 
In summary, “WOTC helps targeted workers move from economic dependency 
into self-sufficiency as they earn a steady income and become contributing 
taxpayers, while participating employers are able to reduce their income tax 
liability.”116 Thus, in addressing the question of whether the WOTC is cost-
effective to employers and to society, “the answer seems to be decidedly 
positive.”117 
C. Employers Are Not Using the WOTC 
Another question that is important to ask in order to assess the WOTC is 
whether employers are even using the WOTC in the first place. Each year, 
employers claim about one billion dollars in tax credits under the WOTC.118 This 
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might seem like a significant amount, but in reality, employer participation in the 
program is “surprisingly low.”119 For example, looking at the welfare target groups, 
Professor Sarah Hamersma suggests that only one-tenth to one-third of eligible 
welfare recipients have actually obtained a WOTC certification.120 Some reasons 
for low participation include “lack of information among firms, lack of firms’ 
interest in involvement with government programs, high transaction costs relative 
to benefits, or difficulty in identifying qualified workers.”121 This low participation 
is unfortunate and is likely the principal reason the WOTC does not significantly 
increase the employment of WOTC-eligible individuals.122 Cappelli, who 
answered the question of cost-effectiveness in the affirmative, also noted, “If we 
ask, has the WOTC program had a substantial effect on moving the typical targeted 
individual into jobs, the answer would appear to be only modestly so because of 
this low employer participation.”123 
D. Recommendations Regarding the WOTC 
As previously mentioned, this Note suggests conducting more thorough 
research on the question presented in Part II.A—that is, whether the WOTC is 
changing participating employers’ hiring practices. Second, to make the WOTC 
incentive more attractive, Congress should consider increasing the amount of the 
subsidy. The GAO study found that employers estimated that the WOTC subsidy 
made up for about forty-seven percent of employers’ costs of recruiting, hiring, 
and training WOTC workers.124 Even though many argue that the WOTC is cost-
effective for employers, only forty-seven percent cost coverage does not make 
WOTC participation appear worthwhile from the employers’ perspective: “[T]he 
subsidy is not big enough to cause many employers to shift their hiring decision to 
WOTC-eligible applicants. We know that is true because the program has only 
modest effects on improving the employment prospects of the average targeted 
individual: Not many employers participate.”125 Increasing the amount of the 
subsidy could rectify this problem and encourage more employers to participate.126 
In addition to the size of the subsidy, another area of the WOTC that this Note 
recommends improving is the paperwork involved. State WOTC coordinators have 
recommended that the paperwork and forms be simplified to make employers more 
inclined to participate.127 In the GAO analysis, nearly half of WOTC-participating 
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employers used consultants to handle the WOTC paperwork.128 One recommenda-
tion to simplify the process would be to streamline and consolidate the forms.129 If 
done effectively, this could be an easy fix that would attract more employers to the 
WOTC. 
Another recommendation, both for the state and federal governments, is imple-
menting a tax subsidy that is similar to the WOTC but solely targets ex-offenders. 
The WOTC’s target group of “ex-felons” is a small subset of all the target groups 
the subsidy aims to help, and extra steps could be taken to target ex-offenders more 
exclusively. For instance, the WOTC “ex-felons” target group does not include 
“ex-offenders that were convicted of misdemeanors or ex-felons that were 
convicted or released more than a year from the potential employment date.”130 
The WOTC ex-felon population could be broadened. For example, Illinois has 
implemented a tax credit that allows any employer that hires any number of 
“qualified ex-offenders” to apply for a credit amount equal to five percent of 
qualified wages paid or up to $1500 per hire.131 A “qualified ex-offender” must 
have been formerly incarcerated in an Illinois adult correction facility and hired 
within the first year of his or her release from prison.132 This tax credit, therefore, 
does not require the worker to be an ex-felon. 
III. BAN THE BOX 
Ban the Box is another policy that aims to help ex-offenders’ employment pro-
spects by mandating that employers remove from their hiring applications the 
check box that asks if applicants have a criminal record.133 In other words, Ban the 
Box aims to delay the employer from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal 
history until later in the hiring process after the ex-offender has had the opportunity 
to demonstrate his or her qualifications.134 The goal of Ban the Box is similar to 
that of the WOTC—to help chronically unemployed individuals secure 
employment. Proponents of Ban the Box argue that including the check box on job 
applications “puts up a barrier for people who want to work, educate themselves, 
provide for their families, and lead healthy, productive lives.”135 President Obama 
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“banned the box” on federal government job applications,136 and more than 130 
cities and counties, as well as more than twenty states, have banned the box to some 
degree.137 
Recent debate on ex-offender employment has focused heavily on the unintended 
negative consequences of Ban the Box. While state and local governments have been 
increasingly implementing Ban the Box, two recent studies138 sparked a new conver-
sation about Ban the Box policies. The studies claim that while Ban the Box certainly 
improves job prospects for ex-offenders, “this gain comes at the cost of encouraging 
a substantial increase in racial discrimination by employers.”139 According to these 
studies, Ban the Box has adversely affected the employment prospects of young men 
of color, including those who do not have a conviction record.140 Removing infor-
mation about job applicants’ criminal records causes employers “to guess who the 
ex-offenders are, and avoid interviewing”141 the individuals the employers think 
might have a criminal history,142 thus discriminating against demographic groups that 
are more likely to have a criminal record: more often than not these are young men 
of color. 
One of the two recent Ban the Box studies is discussed in a National Bureau of 
Economic Research publication.143 The study examined data for 855,772 men aged 
twenty-five to thirty-four.144 Approximately 60% of the sample of men had no 
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college degree,145 and 46% of the men lived in jurisdictions that have adopted Ban 
the Box.146 The researchers calculated the employment probability for these men on 
the basis of their race, ethnicity, and geographic location.147 Next, they compared 
that probability with the actual percentage of men from each group who were 
employed.148 The study concluded that banning the box reduced employment by 
5.1% for young black men without a college degree and by 2.9% for young Hispanic 
men without a college degree.149 
The other recent Ban the Box study was conducted by professors at the University 
of Michigan and Rutgers University.150 This study consisted of sending approxi-
mately 15,000 fictitious job applications to employers throughout New York and 
New Jersey both before and after the adoption of Ban the Box legislation.151 The 
professors’ research concluded that Ban the Box 
encourage[s] statistical discrimination on the basis of race: . . . . [T]he 
race gap in callbacks grows dramatically at the [Ban-the-Box]-affected 
companies after the policy goes into effect. Before [Ban the Box], white 
applicants to employers with the box received 7% more callbacks than 
similar black applicants, but [Ban the Box] increases this gap to 45%.152 
Sonja Starr, one of the professors who conducted this study, said, “[W]hen it 
comes to [Ban the Box’s] goal, it has backfired.”153 She continued, “Our results don’t 
necessarily definitively argue against Ban the Box . . . . It clearly has benefits for 
people with records . . . . But our results are very worrisome in terms of the effects 
for black male applicants, especially those without criminal records.”154 Victoria 
Lipnic, Commissioner of the EEOC, stated, “[W]here, in fact, in the absence of a 
criminal background check an employer chooses to use race as a proxy for criminal 
history, that employer is patently violating federal civil rights law.”155 However, 
actually proving that an employer has used race as a proxy for a criminal record is 
very hard to do.156  
These two studies sparked much debate concerning Ban the Box policies. The 
National Law Employment Project responded to the findings, stating: 
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The core problem raised by the studies is not ban-the-box but entrenched 
racism in the hiring process, which manifests as racial profiling of 
African Americans as “criminals.” . . . The studies highlight the need for 
a more robust policy response to both boost job opportunities for people 
with records and tackle race discrimination in the hiring process—not a 
repeal of ban-the-box laws.157 
Ban the Box proponents point to the progress the initiative has made. For exam-
ple, after the implementation of Ban the Box in the District of Columbia, the city 
hired thirty-three percent more people with criminal records.158 In 2011, Ban the Box 
took effect in Durham, North Carolina, and by 2014, “the overall proportion of peo-
ple with criminal records hired by the City of Durham had increased nearly 7 fold.”159 
Looking at these numbers, the progress that Ban the Box has made cannot be ig-
nored—but this progress is at the cost of increased racial profiling of men of color. 
IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE WOTC AND BAN THE BOX 
When evaluating the pros and cons of Ban the Box, examining the interplay be-
tween Ban the Box and the WOTC is important. The two initiatives have the same 
overarching goal: to help disadvantaged individuals secure employment. However, 
the manner in which these two initiatives approach this goal is in conflict. Ban the 
Box seeks to improve ex-offenders’ employment prospects by essentially hiding or 
delaying inquiry into their criminal records. The WOTC, on the other hand, seeks to 
improve ex-felons’ (as well as other target groups’) employment prospects by ac-
knowledging their criminal records and encouraging employers to hire these ex-of-
fenders despite their criminal histories. Are these two approaches incompatible with 
each other, and if so, is one approach better than the other? Or is there a way in which 
they can work together effectively?  
There do not appear to be any published studies that show how Ban the Box af-
fects WOTC use. This Note hypothesizes that Ban the Box decreases the number of 
WOTC certifications for ex-felons. In jurisdictions that have Ban the Box, employers 
do not know at the initial hiring stage if applicants would be eligible for the WOTC 
as ex-felons. As a result of Ban the Box, employers do not learn about the applicant’s 
criminal history until later in the hiring process.160 From an employer’s perspective, 
some argue that Ban the Box policies cost too much time, money, and resources 
before the employer realizes—after learning of an applicant’s criminal history—that 
the applicant does not meet the position’s background requirements, and therefore 
the applicant does not qualify for the job.161  
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Because Ban the Box advocates for delaying inquiry into applicants’ criminal his-
tories and the WOTC advocates for using ex-felon status as a marketing tool as a 
jobseeker, it is difficult to think of a way in which these two initiatives work effec-
tively together. While Ban the Box is a well-intentioned plan, the research on it il-
lustrates this nation’s deeply rooted racial profiling problem and many employers’ 
reluctance to hire individuals who have a criminal history.162 This reluctance con-
tributes to the cycle of recidivism.163 However, the WOTC could potentially address 
this problem if more employers utilize it.164  
Despite Ban the Box’s problems, this Note does not recommend repealing Ban 
the Box legislation because of the progress it has made and because “[t]he nation 
cannot afford to turn back the clock on a decade of reform that has created significant 
job opportunities for people with records.”165 As a society, we should aim to change 
employers’ hiring practices so that they are less fearful of hiring ex-offenders. 
Concealing important information about an applicant—his or her criminal record—
while proven to help ex-offenders get hired, is not the right way to change employers’ 
hiring practices. We should strive to live in a society where employers have the full 
picture of an applicant, including his or her criminal record, and nonetheless are en-
couraged to hire the individual. Perhaps this begins with educating employers on the 
issues outlined in Part I and on how to help these individuals succeed in the work-
place. Employers will then be more prepared to hire these individuals, instead of 
playing guessing games or finding out late in the process that their applicant is an ex-
offender. In sum, “[e]ncouraging employers to hire ex-offenders through incentives 
like income tax credits [such as the WOTC] will eliminate the need for ‘Ban the Box’ 
legislation.”166 
CONCLUSION 
Current policies are not doing enough to promote employing ex-offenders. The 
research is clear: ex-offender unemployment fosters criminal behavior, and success-
ful ex-offender employment decreases criminal behavior. That being the case, soci-
ety has much to gain from successful employment of former prisoners. Conversely, 
society has much to lose if ex-offender employment is not taken seriously, and the 
staggering, costly recidivism rates will likely endure. 
This Note has argued that if employers were more inclined to take advantage of 
the WOTC, there would be less of a need for legislation such as Ban the Box. To 
utilize the WOTC to its full potential, it is imperative for society to lessen the stigma 
attached to having a criminal record, thereby changing employers’ attitudes towards 
hiring ex-offenders. Legislators, employers, and the public generally must recognize 
that ex-offenders cannot be relied on to fix the challenges of reentry themselves. The 
solution calls for a societal reform and requires an educated, informed public that 
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understands the obstacles ex-offenders face when reentering society and seeking a 
job. Society ought to encourage employers to be willing, equipped, and ready to em-
ploy ex-offenders. Employment is only one component of the reentry process, but it 
just might be that successful ex-offender employment is the key to closing the re-
volving prison cell door. 
